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ANIMAL ETHICS AND THE LAW
Bernard Rollin* †
Introduction
Everyone reading this Article is doubtless aware of the woeful lack of
legal protection for farm animals in the United States. Not only do the laws
fail to assure even a minimally decent life for the majority of these animals,
they do not provide protection against the most egregious treatment. As both
a philosopher who has helped articulate new emerging societal ethics for
animals, and as one who has successfully developed laws embodying that
ethic—notably the 1985 federal laws protecting laboratory animals—I will
stress the direction we need to move in the future to enfranchise farm animals. I have seen ethics inform law and law potentiate ethics—for example,
when preparing my testimony before Congress in 1982 in defense of the
laws mandating control of pain and suffering in laboratory animals, I found
in a literature search only two papers on pain control, a telling indicator of
the failure of the research community to practice pain control. Today there
are somewhere between 5,000 and 10,000 such papers, and the practice of
pain control has correlatively increased exponentially, all as a result of a
legislative mandate. I also believe in the power of articulated societal ethics
in effecting change—I was partly instrumental in convincing Smithfield to
abandon sow stalls by ethical discussion with some of its senior executives.
I will thus discuss the ethical basis of future laws.
I. Society’s View Towards Animal Mistreatment
Anyone attending to cultural history over the last three decades would
note a crescendo of societal concern about animal treatment across the
Western world. During this period, laws and regulations constraining the use
of animals in a variety of areas including biomedical research and agriculture have proliferated worldwide. In the United States, two pieces of
landmark laboratory animal laws passed in 1985 despite vigorous and powerful opposition from the research community, who publicized the claim that
such laws would threaten human health. In the European Union, increasingly
stringent regulations pertaining to both toxicological testing and animal agriculture have been promulgated (for example, sow stalls must be abandoned
within a decade and in vitro cosmetic testing must replace animal testing). In
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Sweden in 1988, the Parliament passed, virtually unopposed, a law eliminating confinement agriculture (colloquially known as “factory farming”).
Recent years in the United States have witnessed numerous examples of
federal bills floated in Congress pertaining to animal welfare in areas as
diverse as protecting marine mammals from tuna nets to preventing duplication in research. In 2003, some 2,100 bills relevant to animal treatment were
introduced in state legislatures. Perhaps most notable was a successful
California law making shipping horses for slaughter, or knowingly selling a
horse to someone who will ship the animal to slaughter, a felony. A similar
bill is now being pursued in Congress.
Historically both the laws protecting animals and the societal ethic informing them were extremely minimalist. In essence, they forbade
outrageous neglect and deliberate, willful, sadistic, deviant, extraordinary, or
unnecessary cruelty not essential for “ministering to the necessities of man,”
as one court put it. This ethic is rooted in the Bible and in the Middle Ages,
when St. Thomas Aquinas taught that animals were not direct objects of
moral concern, but nevertheless presciently forbade cruelty to them.
Aquinas warned that those who were cruel to animals would inexorably
“graduate” to people, an insight buttressed by decades of research. Beginning in roughly 1800, anti-cruelty laws were codified in the legal systems of
most western societies.
II. Factors that Demand a New Framework
If the anti-cruelty ethic and laws sufficed for most of human history, the
question naturally arises as to why the past three decades called forth a demand for a new ethic and new laws. In contract research I undertook for
USDA, I identified five factors:
Demographics have changed, with consequent changes in the paradigm
for animals. At the turn of the century, more than half the population was
engaged in producing food for the rest. Today only some 1.5% of the U.S.
public is engaged in production agriculture. One hundred years ago, if one
were to ask a person in the street, urban or rural, to state the words that
come into their mind when one said “animal,” the answer would doubtless
have been “horse,” “cow,” “food,” “work,” etc. Today, however, the majority
of the population would give the answer “dog,” “cat,” or “pet.” Repeated
studies show that almost 100% of the pet-owning population views their
animals as members of the family. And virtually no one views them as an
income source. Divorce lawyers note that custody of the dog can be as
thorny an issue as custody of the children!
We have lived through a long period of ethical soul-searching. For almost fifty years, society has turned its “ethical searchlight” on humans that
are traditionally ignored or oppressed by the consensus ethic—blacks,
women, the handicapped, and other minorities. The same ethical imperative
has focused attention on our treatment of the nonhuman world: the environment and animals. In fact, many leaders of the activist animal movement
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have roots in earlier movements, such as civil rights, feminism, homosexual
rights, children’s rights, and labor.
The media have discovered that “animals sell papers.” One cannot
channel-surf across normal television service without being bombarded with
animal stories, both real and fictional. (A New York Times reporter recently
told me that more time on cable television in New York City is devoted to
animals than to any other subject.) Recall, for example, the extensive media
coverage a decade ago of some whales trapped in an ice floe and freed by a
Russian icebreaker. It seems someone in the Kremlin realized that liberating
the whales was a cheap way to win credit with U.S. public opinion.
Strong and visible arguments have been advanced in favor of raising the
status of animals by philosophers, scientists, and celebrities.
The mid-twentieth century met with precipitous change in animal use.
This is the most significant reason for the demand for a new ethic and new
laws in anti-cruelty.
Traditionally society’s major use for animals was agricultural—food, fiber, locomotion, and power. The key to agricultural success was good
husbandry, which meant taking great pains to provide animals with the best
possible environment one could find to meet their physical and psychological natures (which, following Aristotle, I call telos), and then augmenting
their ability to survive and thrive by providing them with food during famine, protection from predation, water during drought, medical attention, help
in birthing, and so on. Thus traditional agriculture was roughly a fair contract between humans and animals, with both sides benefiting from the
relationship. Husbandry agriculture was about placing square pegs into
square holes, round pegs into round holes, and creating as little friction as
possible in doing so. Welfare was thus assured by the strongest of sanctions:
self-interest. The anti-cruelty ethic needed only to deal with sadists and psychopaths unmoved by self-interest.
The rise of confinement agriculture—the application of industrial methods to animal production—broke this ancient contract. With technological
“sanders”—hormones, vaccines, antibiotics, air handling systems, mechanization—we could force square pegs into round holes and place animals into
environments where they suffered in ways irrelevant to productivity. If a
nineteenth-century agriculturalist had tried to put 100,000 egg-laying hens
in cages in a building, they all would have died of disease in a month; today,
such systems dominate. At the same historical moment, animals began to be
used on a large scale in research and testing, again causing new and unprecedented degrees of suffering.
The amount of suffering arising from these sources far outweighs suffering as a result of deliberate cruelty. Further, the anti-cruelty laws do not cover
these new uses, and cannot generally fit anything like steel-jawed trapping,
sow stalls, or toxicology, since these exemplify the aforementioned “ministering to human necessity,” a concept reiterated in the 1985 case Animal Legal
Defense Fund v. The Department of Environment Conservation of the State of
New York, though some attorneys work valiantly to squeeze additional protection for animals out of them. Thus a demand is called forth for a new ethic.
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III. The Role of Animal Rights Talk
In Western societies, human ethics balances utilitarian considerations—
greatest good for the greatest number—against concern for individuals by
building “protective fences” around essential features of human nature;
these fences are called rights. Rights are a moral/legal notion designed to
save essential features of individuals’ human nature—e.g., the desire for free
speech—from being stifled for the general welfare. The logic of this notion
is being exported to animals—society wishes to assure that animals’ basic
interests, flowing from their telos, are not lost. Society wants farm animals
to live decent lives, and laboratory animals to have pain controlled.
Direct rights for animals are of course legally impossible, given the legal
status of animals as property; to change this would require a constitutional
amendment. Many legal scholars are working to elevate the legal status of
animals, and I applaud it. Indeed, I argued for it in 1981 in my book Animal
Rights and Human Morality. But the same functional goal can be accomplished by restricting the use of animal property. For example, the
laboratory animal laws require pain and distress control, forbid repeated
invasive uses, require exercise for dogs, etc. Further, some European laws
have forbidden sow stalls.
This mechanism is the root of what I have called “animal rights as a
mainstream phenomenon.” It also explains the proliferation of laws pertaining to animals as an effort to ensure their welfare in the face of historically
unprecedented uses. Although some thinkers see no value in animal rights
talk, I do, since that is how people think. For example, a Parents magazine
survey conducted in 1990 found that 84% of the U.S. public believes animals have rights! I am thus very hopeful for the future of farm animal
welfare, particularly with some 90 law schools having programs in animal
law, attracting bright students who are animal advocates.

